

A Brief History of Cryptography

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Communications security


- main security services
 - confidentiality
 - integrity
 - authentication
 - non-repudiation
 - access control
- three pillars of security
 - physical protection
 - procedures (policies, educations, etc.)
 - *cryptography (algorithmic tools)*

Evolution of the meaning of cryptography

- until the second half of the 20th century
 - exclusively military (and diplomacy) applications
 - cryptography = confidentiality (encryption)
- from the second half of the 20th century
 - business applications (mainly in the banking sector)
 - cryptography = confidentiality + integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation
- from the end of the 20th century
 - cryptography is part of everyday life
 - Web security (SSL protocol)
 - GSM security



Classical model of (symmetric-key) encryption



- goal of the adversary
 - obtain plaintexts in a systematic manner
 - obtain the key
- the Kerkchoff-principle
 - the adversary knows the details of the encoding and decoding algorithms
 - the adversary does not know the key



Historical examples

- „already the ancient Greeks ...” – the skytale of Sparta
- „veni, vidi, vici” – the Caesar cipher
- the „unbreakable” cipher – Vigenère code
- the first cipher machine – Enigma

Skytale

- used by the Spartans in ~400 B.C.
- transposes the characters of the message
- key = diameter of the baton
practical size of the key space is small



The Caesar cipher

- based on character substitution
 - encoding rule
 - plain: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 - cipher: D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
- RETURN TO ROME → UHWXUA WR URPH
- key = shift of the alphabet (3 in case of Caesar)
size of the key space = $26 - 1 = 25$

Mono-alphabetic substitution

- generalization of the Caesar cipher
- code alphabet = random permutation of the alphabet
 - plain: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 - cipher: T Q L R B W J G F Y N C P E K S D U V I X M Z A H O
- key = the permutation that is used
size of the key space = $26! \sim 1.56 \cdot 10^{28}$

Large numbers

time until next ice age.....	2^{39} seconds
time until the sun goes nova.....	2^{55} seconds
age of the planet.....	2^{55} seconds
age of the Universe.....	2^{59} seconds

number of atoms in the planet.....	2^{170}
number of atoms in the sun.....	2^{190}
number of atoms in the galaxy.....	2^{223}
number of atoms in the Universe	2^{265}
(dark matter excluded)	

volume of the universe.....	2^{280} cm^3
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(source: Schneier, Applied Cryptography, 2nd ed., Wiley 1996)



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Breaking the mono-alphabetic substitution cipher

- each language has characteristic letter statistics
 - in an average text, letters do not occur with uniform frequency
 - some letters occur more frequently than others
 - e.g., in English:
 - e – 12.7%
 - t – 9.1%
 - some letters occur less frequently
 - e.g., in English:
 - z – 0.1%
 - j – 0.2%
- in case of mono-alphabetic substitution, the ciphertext preserves the letter frequency of the plaintext (!)
 - e.g., most frequent character must be the encoding of „e” or „t”
 - after identifying a few mappings, the rest of the code alphabet is usually easy to determine



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Poly-alphabetic substitution – the Vigenère code

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
X	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
Y	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Z	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y

encoding:

key: RELAT IONSR ELATI ONSRE LATIO NSREL
plaintext: TOBEO RNOTT OBETH ATIST HEQUE STION
ciphertext: KSM EH ZBBLK SMEMP OGAJX SEJCS FLZSY

decoding:

key: RELAT IONSR ELATI ONSRE LATIO NSREL
ciphertext: KSM EH ZBBLK SMEMP OGAJX SEJCS FLZSY
plaintext: TOBEO RNOTT OBETH ATIST HEQUE STION



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Enigma

- first electro-mechanical ciphering machine
- patented by Arthur Scherbius in 1918
- introduced in the German Army in 1926




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
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Operating principle of Enigma


- three main parts:
 - keyboard – for typing in plaintexts and ciphertexts
 - display panel – for displaying plaintexts and ciphertexts
 - mixing unit – to produce ciphertext from plaintext and vice versa
- the soul of Enigma is the rotor



Operating principle of Enigma




Operating principle of Enigma



Enigma – keyboard and display panel



Enigma - rotors




(c) 1935, Morton Summer



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Enigma - switching board



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Usage of Enigma

- base setting is determined by the
 - setting of the switching board (pl: A/L – P/R – T/D – B/W – K/F – O/Y)
 - order of the rotors (pl: II – III – I)
 - initial positions of the rotors (pl: Q – C – W)

(size of the key space = $100391791500 \times 6 \times 26^3 \sim 10^{16} \sim 2^{53}$)

- plaintext is typed on the keyboard and ciphertext characters are read from the display panel



Breaking the Enigma




Marian Rejewski
Polish mathematician

- Hans-Thilo Schmidt, German spy, sells the manuals of the military Enigma to the French intelligence service [November 8, 1931]
- based on the information obtained from the manuals, the Allies build a copy of the Enigma
- they believe that the Enigma is unbreakable and give the copy to the Polish
- the Polish Biuro Szyfrów hired 20 mathematicians from the University of Poznan, and selected the best three, among them Marian Rejewski (23)



Breaking the Enigma

- the Germans used a two level key hierarchy
 - daily key – valid for one day, used to encrypt message keys
 - message key – used to encrypt a single message, changed for every message
 - order of the rotors and setting of the switching board is the same as for the daily key, initial positions of the rotors are supposed to be randomly chosen
- for reliability reasons, the message key was encrypted twice with the daily key
- example:



Breaking the Enigma

- Rejewski realized that weak point is the repetition of the message key
- he developed a method to break the Enigma based on this observation
- he automated the method
 - built a machine using several copies of the Enigma
 - due to the ticking noise generated by the machine, it was called *bomb*
- thanks to Rejewski, the Polish intelligence service could routinely break the German communications from 1933

Breaking the Enigma

- in 1938, the Germans strengthened the Enigma
 - 2 new rotors (number of possible ordering increased from 6 to 60)
 - number character swappings on the switching board was increased from 6 to 10
 - size of the key space increased to $1.59 \cdot 10^{20}$
- the Germans prepare to invade Poland
- the Poles decide to reveal their knowledge to the Allies [July, 1939]
- the documentation of the bombs is transported to London [August 16, 1939]
- Germany invades Poland [September 1, 1939]



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Breaking the Enigma



Bletchley Park
[August 1939]



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Breaking the enigma

- the British develop the bombs further, and invent new breaking techniques
 - cilly
 - the German Enigma operators often used very simple message keys, such as those consisting of neighboring characters on the keyboard (e.g., QWE, BNM)
 - an Enigma operator always used the initials of his girl friend (C.I.L.)
 - hence, such a weak key was called *cilly* (~silly)
 - requirements on the order of the rotors
 - the Germans changed the order of the rotors every day (daily key)
 - a given rotor was not allowed to stay in the same position for two consecutive days
 - e.g., after I-II-V, the order III-II-IV was not allowed
 - in fact, this requirement decreased the number of possible orders to be tested by the Allies
 - similarly, neighboring characters were not allowed to be swapped on the switching board



Breaking the Enigma



Alan Turing
British mathematician

- Alan Turing joined Bletchley Park in September 1939
 - he was 27, but already known from his Turing machine
- his task was to find a new method to break the Enigma, which does not take advantage of the repetition of the message key at the beginning of the message
- he solved the problem, the new method exploited the fact that some messages contained known words at known positions
 - German messages were very well structured
 - every evening at 6pm, they sent a weather forecast which contained the word "wetter" in a known position
- based on Turing's work, the British built new *bombs* (machines) called Victory and Agnus Dei [March-August 1940]
- the Germans changed their key exchange method [May 1940]



Breaking the Enigma

- Bletchley Park played a very important role in the victory of the Allies
- according to some historians estimates, World War II could have lasted until 1948 without breaking the Enigma
- after the war, the bombs were disassembled, and all related documents were destroyed
- the cryptographers of Bletchley Park returned to their normal civil life
- Alan Turing committed suicide on June 7, 1954.



A truly unbreakable cipher: the One-Time Pad

- mod 2 addition \oplus : $a \oplus b = (a + b) \bmod 2$

$$0 \oplus 0 = 0$$

$$0 \oplus 1 = 1$$

$$1 \oplus 0 = 1$$

$$1 \oplus 1 = 0$$


- properties of mod 2 addition:

1. $x \oplus x = 0$

2. $x \oplus 0 = x$



Operation of the One-Time Pad



- encoding
 - $y_i = x_i \oplus k_i$
 - where x_i is the i -th bit of the plaintext, and y_i is the i -th bit of the ciphertext
 - k_i is the i -th bit of the uniformly random bit stream
- decoding
 - $x_i = y_i \oplus k_i = x_i \oplus k_i \oplus k_i = x_i$

Perfectness of the One-Time Pad

- assume that the adversary observes ciphertext Y
- as all possible keys are equally likely to be the key that has been used to produce Y , all possible plaintext are equally likely to be the message
- this intuition was formalized by Claude Shannon [1949]

$$I(X; Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) = 0$$

- Shannon also gave necessary conditions for a cipher to be perfect:

$$H(K) \geq H(X)$$

practically this means that the key must be as large as the compressed message

Modern cryptography

- the One-Time Pad provides unconditional security, but it is impractical
- in practice, we are happy with a cipher that provides conditional security
 - the cipher cannot be broken with less than a given amount of resources (computing power)
- practical ciphers are not even proven to be conditionally secure
- well-known examples:
 - DES (Data Encryption Standard)
 - RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)



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Shannon's approach



Claude E. Shannon

- build a complex cipher by repeatedly using many individually weak transformations
 - small substitutions
 - bit permutations
 - simple logical and arithmetic operations
 - ...
- none of these simple transformations would be sufficient alone, but together they may provide strong security





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DES (Data Encryption Standard)


- designed by IBM in the 70's (originally called Lucifer)
- symmetric-key block cipher
- features:
 - Feistel structure (encoding and decoding scheme is the same)
 - number of rounds: 16
 - input size: 64 bits
 - output size: 64 bits
 - key size: 56 bits



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DES round function



- S_i – substitution box (S-box)
- P – permutation box (P-box)



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Linear and differential cryptanalysis of DES

- linear cryptanalysis (LC)
 - linear cryptanalysis is the most powerful attack against DES to date
 - requires an enormous number ($\sim 2^{43}$) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs → infeasible in practical environments
 - could work in a ciphertext only model if plaintexts are redundant (e.g., contain parity bits)
- differential cryptanalysis (DC)
 - most general cryptanalytic tool to date against iterated block ciphers (including DES, FEAL, IDEA)
 - primarily a chosen-plaintext attack
 - in case of DES, it requires $\sim 2^{47}$ chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs → infeasible in practical environments
- DES was optimized against DC when it was designed
- it can, however, be improved with respect to LC (apparently the designers of DES was not aware of this attack at that time)



The birth of asymmetric-key cryptography

- Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman:
New Directions in Cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 1976



Ralph Merkle, Martin Hellman, és Whitfield Diffie




Discrete logarithm as a one-way function

- let p be a prime
- $Z_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$
- let g be a generator of Z_p^*
 - $Z_p^* = \{g^0 \bmod p, g^1 \bmod p, \dots, g^{p-2} \bmod p\}$
- $f(x) = g^x \bmod p$
 - given x , it is easy to compute $f(x)$
 - given $y = f(x)$, it is difficult to compute x (discrete log problem)
- example:
 - $p = 7, Z_7^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}, g = 3$
 - $3^0 = 1, 3^1 = 3, 3^2 = 9 = 2, 3^3 = 27 = 6, 3^4 = 81 = 4, 3^5 = 243 = 5$
- now, try to compute x from $453^x \bmod 21\,997 = 5789$




The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

assumption: prime p and generator g of $Z_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$ are publicly known



Model of asymmetric-key cryptography



- asymmetric key means
 - computing k' from k is hard (NP)
 - k can be made public (hence the name public key cryptography)
- authenticity and integrity of the public key must still be ensured !
 - widely used approach is based on public key certificates and the infrastructure for managing them (PKI)



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The RSA cryptosystem

- Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, és Leonard Adleman,
A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems, 1978



Ronald Rivest



Adi Shamir



Leonard Adleman



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Operation of the RSA cryptosystem

- key generation
 - select p, q large primes (about 500 bits each)
 - $n = pq, \phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
 - select e such that $1 < e < \phi(n)$ and $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
 - compute d such that $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$ (this is easy if $\phi(n)$ is known)
 - the public key is (e, n)
 - the private key is d
- encryption
 - represent the message as an integer m in $[0, n-1]$
 - compute $c = m^e \bmod n$
- decryption
 - compute $m = c^d \bmod n$



A toy example

- let $p = 73, q = 151$
- $n = 73 \cdot 151 = 11023$
- $\phi(n) = 72 \cdot 150 = 10800$
- let $e = 11$ [$\text{Inco}(11, 10800) = 1$, as $10800 = 2^4 \cdot 3^5 \cdot 5^2 \cdot 9$]
- d can be computed with the Euclidean algorithm: $d = 5891$
- assume that $m = 17$
- $c = 17^{11} \bmod 11023 = 1782$
- $m = 1782^{5891} \bmod 11023$
- computing is done using the "square and multiply" approach:
$$\begin{aligned} 5891 &= 2^0 + 2^1 + 2^8 + 2^9 + 2^{10} + 2^{12} \\ 1782^{5891} &= 1782^{2^{12}} * 1782^{2^{10}} * 1782^{2^9} * 1782^{2^8} * 1782^{2^1} * 1782^{2^0} = \\ &= (\dots ((1782^2)^2)^2 \dots)^2 * (\dots ((1782^2)^2)^2 \dots)^2 * \dots \\ &= 17 \pmod{11023} \end{aligned}$$



Security of RSA

- the problem of computing d from (e, n) is computationally equivalent to the problem of factoring n
 - if one can factor n , then he can easily compute d
 - if one can compute d , then he can efficiently factor n
- the problem of computing m from c and (e, n) (RSA problem) is believed to be computationally equivalent to factoring
 - if one can factor n , then he can easily compute m from c and (e, n)
 - there's no formal proof for the other direction
- given the latest progress in developing algorithms for factoring, the size of the modulus should at least be 1024 bits



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The secret story of public key cryptography



James Ellis



Clifford Cocks



Malcolm Williamson



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
The secret story of public key cryptography

- Ellis, Cocks, and Williamson worked for the British intelligence service
- in 1969, Ellis developed the idea of public key cryptography
 - he had the model, and
 - he knew that some kind of a one-way function is needed that can be inverted only if some secret information is available
- in 1973, Cocks invented the RSA algorithm
 - Cocks was exposed to the problem, and solved it in half an hour
 - he was a mathematician working on number theory, so he immediately thought of factoring as a hard problem that can serve as a basis for the one-way function needed
- in 1974, Williamson (a friend of Cocks) discovered the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
- by 1975, Ellis, Cocks, és Williamson developed all the fundamental elements of public key cryptography, but they had to keep them secret (until 1997)

The SSL protocol

- developed by Netscape in the mid 90's
- makes it possible to establish a secured TCP connection between two remote computers
- typical application is securing web transactions (communications between a browser and a web server)
- widely used in practice (SSL 3.0)
- standardized by the IETF under the name of TLS (Transport Layer Security)

Operation of SSL



Operation of SSL (simplified)

